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Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) (U.S. GFC)1
Manuel León Hoyos2,3
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
March 20, 2019; Revised: October 10, 2020
Abstract
The 2007–09 financial crisis reached a critical stage in March 2008. Amid falling house prices
and downgrades of mortgage-related securities, financial markets became severely
disrupted. The Federal Reserve—the US central bank—became increasingly concerned
about the inability of the 20 primary dealers, including the five largest US investment banks,
to fund themselves in short-term funding markets, such as the repurchase agreement
market, then estimated at $10 trillion. In response, the Fed created several emergency
lending facilities to restore market liquidity that required the Fed to invoke Section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act. The Term Securities Lending Facility authorized the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York to lend to primary dealers up to $200 billion of highly liquid US
Treasuries against collateral that was particularly illiquid at the time. Eligible collateral
initially included triple-A private-label mortgage-backed securities but was later broadened.
In July 2008, an additional $50 billion was allocated for a TSLF Options Program. The TSLF
operated between March 27, 2008, and February 1, 2010. Usage peaked at $236 billion in
October 2008. Overall, 18 of the 20 primary dealers participated and the Fed collected $781
million in fees.
Keywords: Federal Reserve, central bank, financial crisis, lending facilities, lender of last
resort, market liquidity

____________________________________________________________________
1 This case study is part of Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project modules

considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to market liquidity programs.
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
2 Manuel León Hoyos – Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
3 Special thanks to Julia Arnous for research contributions.
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Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)
At a Glance
In March 2008, financial markets became
severely disrupted amid falling house
prices and downgrades of mortgagerelated securities. Particularly distressed
was the repurchase agreement (repo)
market, then estimated at $10 trillion. The
Federal Reserve (the Fed)—the US central
bank—concerned about the inability of
primary dealers to obtain funds, invoked
the emergency powers of Section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act (FRA), last used
during the Great Depression, to act as
lender of last resort to nondepository
institutions. The Term Securities Lending
Facility (TSLF) was the first of many
emergency lending facilities during the
crisis.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To promote liquidity in the financing
markets for Treasury and other collateral and thus to
foster the functioning of financial markets more
generally
Announcement Date
Operational Date
End of Issuance
Window
Legal Authority
Peak Utilization
Participants
Administrator

March 11, 2008
March 27, 2008
February 1, 2010
Sections 13(3) and 14 of the
Federal Reserve Act
$236 billion on October 1,
2008
Primary dealers of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York
Federal Reserve Bank of New
York

The TSLF was used by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (FRBNY) to lend to its 20
primary dealers, including the largest five US investment banks and the US securities arms
of foreign financial institutions, up to $200 billion of highly liquid US Treasuries against
collateral that was relatively illiquid at the time. In view of the great demand for US
Treasuries as a “safe haven,” the TSLF was intended to restore market liquidity, particularly
for the repo market.
The list of eligible collateral initially included triple-A private-label mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) but was later expanded. In July 2008, an additional $50 billion was allocated
for a TSLF Options Program (TOP). In September 2008, a day prior to the collapse of Lehman
Brothers—the largest bankruptcy in US history—the Fed greatly expanded TSLF eligible
collateral to include any investment-grade securities (BBB- or higher). TSLF utilization
intensified, reaching its peak of $236 billion in October 2008. The TSLF operated until
February 1, 2010. Overall, 18 primary dealers participated and the Fed collected
$781 million in fees.
Summary Evaluation
Since the TSLF was one of many emergency lending facilities deployed during the 2007–09
financial crisis, it is hard to evaluate its direct impact on financial markets generally. The
effect of the TSLF announcement on market participants was mixed. While Fed Chairman
Bernanke (2015) thought it calmed the markets, US Treasury Secretary Paulson (2010)
thought that “the opposite happened.” Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2010) and Hrung and
Seligman (2011) argued that the TSLF contributed to the reduction of stress on repo
markets. Recently, Carlson & Macchiavelli (2018) conducted further analysis of the TSLF.
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Term Securities Lending Facility: United States Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

$14,681.5 billion in 2007
$14,559.5 billion in 2008

Source: Bloomberg

GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

$47,976 in 2007
$48,383 in 2008

Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4, 2007:
Sovereign credit
rating (5-year senior
debt)

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

As of Q4, 2008:

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA

Source: Bloomberg
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$9,231.7 billion in total assets in 2007
Size of banking
system

$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008

Source: Bloomberg
62.9% in 2007
Size of banking
system as a
percentage of GDP

68.3% in 2008

Source: Bloomberg

Size of banking
system as a
percentage of
financial system

Banking system assets equal to 29.0% of
financial system in 2007
Banking system assets equal to 30.5% of
financial system in 2008

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
43.9% of total banking assets in 2007
5-bank concentration
of banking system

44.9% of total banking assets in 2008

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
22% of total banking assets in 2007
Foreign involvement
in banking system

18% of total banking assets in 2008

Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
0% of banks owned by the state in 2008
Government
ownership of banking
system

Source: World Bank, Bank Regulation and
Supervision Survey
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Existence of deposit
insurance

100% insurance on deposits up to $100,000
for 2007
100% insurance on deposits up to $250,000
for 2008

Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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Overview

Background
The financial crisis that started in the second half of 2007 entered a critical stage in March
2008. Financial markets became severely disrupted and credit was scarce and expensive.
Amid falling house prices and downgrades of mortgage-related securities, lenders limited
their exposure to only the safest securities. Bear Stearns Companies, the fifth-largest
investment bank with $400 billion in assets, teetered on the brink of collapse (GAO 2011;
Geithner 2014).
Primary dealers4 such as Bear Stearns were particularly vulnerable as they relied on the
repurchase agreement (repo) market for funding (Gorton and Metrick 2012). A repo
transaction is basically a short-term loan in which a firm sells a security to another firm with
the agreement to buy it at a later date for a slightly higher predetermined price. These
transactions occur on a very short-term basis, typically overnight.
By March 2008, the repo market, estimated at $10 trillion at the time, had become illiquid
(Gorton and Metrick 2010). Primary dealers struggled to obtain financing, as they could no
longer sell a large portion of their securities (Geithner 2014). Rates for overnight borrowing
of instruments such as Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and agency mortgagebacked securities (MBS) rose from an average of less than 10 basis points (bps) to more than
60 bps (Fleming, Hrung, and Keane 2010). The Federal Reserve (the Fed)—the US central
bank—became concerned about market liquidity and the functioning of financial markets
(Federal Reserve 2008a).
On March 7, 2008, the Fed introduced the Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements
program,5 which allocated up to $100 billion to conduct term (28-day) repurchase
agreements with primary dealers. This program excluded private-label mortgage-related
securities and accepted only high-quality collateral, eligible in the Fed’s regular open market
operations (OMOs) in which the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) trades
overnight securities with its primary dealers. The Fed, through the FRBNY, crafted a new and
larger program, the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), intended to support primary
dealers. In view of the great demand for US Treasury securities as a “safe haven,” and to
reduce the need for a fire sale of illiquid assets, the FRBNY would lend highly liquid US
Treasury securities at a 28-day term—much longer than the typical overnight term—and
against a broader range of collateral (Federal Reserve 2008a; Geithner 2014). Throughout
the crisis, the Fed created multiple emergency lending facilities intended to restore market
liquidity, such as the TSLF.6,7
____________________________________________________________________
Primary dealers are about 20 securities firms that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) has
designated to trade US government securities on a regular basis. Most primary dealers are affiliated with banks.
However, this doesn’t give them access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window. The discount window is
available only to legal entities that are depository institutions. US securities firms had limited ability to source
liquidity from their bank affiliates during the crisis. For that reason, the Fed believed it needed to create
programs like Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) to promote market liquidity by lending directly to
securities firms.
5
For information about the Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements program, see:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_tranche.htm.
6 For a crisis timeline and info on Fed’s actions, see https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline.
7 For TSLF information, see Federal Reserve 2018 and FRBNY 2018a.
4
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Program Description
On March 10, 2008, a week prior to a scheduled regular meeting of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), Fed Chairman Bernanke convoked an emergency conference call.
Financial market disruptions rushed the Fed to speed up the creation of emergency lending
facilities. That same day, with a unanimous vote of the five sitting Board Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and a 9–0 vote of the FOMC, the TSLF was approved. The Fed
invoked the emergency powers of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (FRA) that
permitted it to lend to nondepository institutions “in unusual and exigent circumstances”
(Federal Reserve 2009). The TSLF was announced a day later, on March 11, 2008, although
without any reference to Section 13(3) or emergency authority. The Fed “worried that
trumpeting the invocation of emergency powers last used in the Depression would deepen
the panic” (Bernanke 2015).
Under the TSLF, the FRBNY was able to lend primary dealers as much as $200 billion in
highly liquid US Treasury securities such as Treasury bills, notes, bonds, and inflationindexed securities. The facility took advantage of existing infrastructure and had some
similarities in design to the FRBNY’s open market operations. The FRBNY pulled out US
Treasury securities for the operation of this facility from the System Open Market Account
(SOMA) (Federal Reserve 2009). However, it took two weeks for the facility to become
operational. In the meantime, JPMorgan Chase & Company acquired Bear Stearns for $2 per
share with emergency assistance from the Fed.8
The FRBNY offered to lend US Treasury securities at a 28-day term (in some cases adjusted
for holidays) against a broader range of collateral. Initially, the list of eligible collateral
included illiquid collateral at the time, such as triple-A private-label residential MBS and
commercial MBS, as well as agency collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) (FRBNY
2008a). By awarding loans through auctions, the Fed intended to encourage broad
participation and avoid any stigma in using this facility. The TSLF consisted of weekly
auctions (Thursdays at 2 p.m. ET) in which bids represented the fee dealers intended to pay
to loan the offered US Treasury securities. At the end of each auction, the FRBNY awarded
loans at a uniform fee, based on the “stop-out rate,” which was the lowest accepted bid.
TSLF auctions started on March 27, 2008, and were classified into two categories: Schedule
1 and Schedule 2. While Schedule 1 auctions accepted all collateral eligible in the FRBNY’s
open market operations, Schedule 2 auctions offered a larger amount of US Treasury
securities, accepted a much broader and less liquid range of collateral, and required a higher
minimum bid. The two different schedules were intended “to better calibrate the interest
rate on TSLF loans to the level of risk associated with the collateral” (GAO 2011).
Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act already allowed the FRBNY to trade securities eligible
for Schedule 1 auctions for purposes of OMOs. However, the TSLF required FRA Section
13(3) approval because, in expanding the collateral for Schedule 2 auctions to include types
of securities that were not authorized in the FRBNY’s open market operations, it was lending
to nondepository institutions (the primary dealers) for the purpose of acting as their lender
of last resort.
The Fed used the clearing services of the existing clearing banks in the triparty repo market,
JPMorgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon Corporation. The clearing banks acted as
____________________________________________________________________
The price settled at $10 per share. The Fed facilitated a $30 billion emergency loan to JPMorgan Chase.
Between March 10 and March 13, Bear Stearns had experienced a depletion of its cash reserves from $18 billion
to $2 billion.
8
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intermediaries and provided the daily services of custody and valuation of collateral. The
services of the clearing banks came at no charge to the Federal Reserve or borrowers
(Federal Reserve 2009).
Participation in the TSLF was voluntary and undisclosed. In July 2010, however, the US
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank), which requires the Fed to disclose information about OMOs and discount window
borrowers, two years after transactions occur. For emergency lending facilities under
Section 13(3) authority, the Fed is required to disclose information of borrowers a year after
the facility ends (Federal Reserve 2010).9
The day before a TSLF auction, the FRBNY announced the amount of US Treasury securities
offered, which ranged between $25 billion and $75 billion. TSLF auctions lasted for 30
minutes, and the results on awards and stop-out rates were communicated shortly
thereafter (Federal Reserve 2008a).
Schedule 1 auctions imposed a minimum bid of 10 bps, while Schedule 2 required a higher
minimum of 25 bps. There was no cost to place a bid. Dealers could place up to two bids, with
a minimum amount of $10 million and a maximum of 20% of the total offered amount. In
case of two bids, they could only be in increments of $10 million. The FRBNY awarded loans
in full for bids above the stop-out rate and on a pro rata basis for bids at the stop-out rate
and held the right to refuse any bid at its own discretion. Dealers were not allowed to
terminate a loan early (FRBNY 2009).
The FRBNY imposed margins (haircuts)10 on all collateral. The TSLF terms and conditions
stipulated the daily revaluation of collateral by the clearing banks to make sure the specified
margins were applied. Every day, the clearing banks conducted the valuation of collateral. In
case the value of the collateral decreased, the FRBNY could ask for substitutions. On the other
hand, primary dealers could also substitute collateral for oth0er eligible collateral if needed.
To value the pledged collateral, clearing banks used the lowest price available in their
valuation systems. This reduced the risk for the Fed in case of bankruptcy of a borrowing
primary dealer. The loans were recourse. That is, in case of default, the Fed could come after
the primary dealer’s assets to claim the difference between the liquidation of the pledged
collateral and the value of the loan (GAO 2011)
With the escalating strains on financial markets, on July 24, 2008, the FOMC arranged a
conference call and voted to extend the TSLF until January 30, 2009. The FOMC also
approved the TSLF Options Program (TOP) as an extension to the TSLF.11 The TOP was
announced on July 30, 2008. It required administrative changes pursuant to Schedule 2
auctions and not another Section 13(3) authorization (Federal Reserve 2009). The new
program authorized the FRBNY to offer through auctions the option to borrow US Treasury
securities for a seven-day term, two to three weeks after the auction date and at a fixed rate.
The TOP intended to provide primary dealers some relief during periods of “heightened
collateral market pressure, such as quarter-end dates” (Federal Reserve 2018). TOP auctions
started in late August 2008 and required a minimum bid of 1 bp; all Schedule 2 collateral
was eligible. The facility was limited to $50 billion in US Treasury securities, on top of the
____________________________________________________________________
For
the
Fed’s
disclosures,
see
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_quarterly_transaction.htm.
10 A margin or haircut requires the pledged collateral to be of greater value than the securities borrowed.
11 Only Governor Plosser dissented. He considered “the net benefit of the TSLF options as being insufficient to
justify adding them to the support already being provided to market liquidity.” See
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/annual08/pdf/AR08.pdf.
9
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$200 billion of Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 auctions. The day before each TOP auction, the
FRBNY announced the terms and conditions, including the fixed rate of the loans.
On September 14, 2008, a day prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers—the fourth largest
investment bank and largest bankruptcy in US history—the Fed took another expansionary
step.12 With financial markets in disarray, TSLF Schedule 2 eligible collateral was expanded
to include all investment-grade debt securities (BBB- or higher) and auctions increased from
$125 billion to $150 billion per month. Schedule 2 auctions started to run weekly, instead of
biweekly, until the end of April 2009, when they returned to a biweekly basis. In the January
2009 FOMC meeting, the TSLF was extended until October 2009 (Federal Reserve 2009).
By June 2009, financial markets showed significant signs of improvement. Effective July 1,
2009, the Fed suspended TSLF Schedule 1 and TOP auctions. The TSLF size was reduced to
$75 billion for Schedule 2 auctions, which decreased from biweekly to once a month. After
July 16, 2009, auctions received no participation. The last auction took place on January 7,
2010. While the TSLF was in operation, the Fed published information on the total amount
of propositions, awards, stop-out rate, and bid-to-cover ratio of each auction, but it did not
disclose the identity of the participant primary dealers or the bid propositions (FRBNY
2018a).
Outcomes
The TSLF operated between March 27, 2008, and February 1, 2010. Overall, 18 of the 20
primary dealers participated in the TSLF and 11 participated in the TOP as well. All TSLF
loans were paid in full and with interest. The Fed collected a total of $781 million in fees
(Federal Reserve 2010). The TSLF reached its peak utilization of $236 billion on October 1,
2008. See figures 1 and 2 below.
Figure 1: TSLF Utilization

Source: GAO 2011.
____________________________________________________________________
12

Lehman Brothers had been an active participant of the TSLF up until the September 11, 2008, auction. The
investment bank received 18 TSLF loans. Its total borrowing peak was $19 billion.
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Figure 2: List of Primary Dealers of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Primary Dealer

Schedule
1

Schedule
2

TOP

TSLF
Loans

Borrowing
Peak
(dollars in
millions)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated
Goldman Sachs & Co.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Citigroup Global Markets Inc.
RBS Securities Inc.
Barclays Capital Inc.
UBS Securities LLC.
Merrill Lynch Government Securities
Inc.
Lehman Brothers Inc.
Banc of America Securities LLC
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC
BNP Paribas Securities Corp.
Countrywide Securities Corporation
Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.
Dresdner Kleinwort Securities LLC
Cantor Fitzgerald & Co.
HSBC Securities (USA) Inc.
Daiwa Securities America Inc.
Mizuho Securities USA Inc.
Jefferies & Company, Inc. (*)
RBC Capital Markets Corporation (*)

TOTAL

11
6
15
20
20
14
21
4
5

42
28
38
32
45
44
44
17
34

1
3
2
1
2
1
1
0
1

53
34
53
52
65
58
65
21
39

$38.510
$36,000
$34,500
$34,284
$34,100
$32,200
$26,200
$23,823
$21,777

5
8
7
9
5
0
2
4
0
-

13
15
16
12
5
2
0
5
11
-

0
1
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
-

18
23
23
21
10
2
2
9
11
0
0
0
0

$19,000
$17,203
$13,000
$11,500
$3,600
$2,000
$850
$700
$500

156

403

17

559

*The institution became a primary dealer in June or July 2009.
Source: Author’s analysis of Federal Reserve data.
The FRBNY held a total of 97 TSLF auctions: 58 Schedule 2, 33 Schedule 1, and six TOP.
Overall, the FRBNY awarded a total of 559 TSLF loans; 156 Schedule 1 and 403 Schedule 2.
Of the 403 Schedule 2 collateral loans, 17 were TOP. Schedule 2 auctions received the most
demand. The highest stop-out rates occurred in the Schedule 2 auctions of September 17,
October 9, and October 15, at 300 bps, 305 bps, and 322 bps, respectively.13
TSLF auctions started on March 27, 2008, and ran weekly, alternating between Schedule 1
and Schedule 2, until September 11, 2008. In these first months of operation, the Fed offered
$175 billion of the available $200 billion: $50 billion for Schedule 1 auctions and $125 billion
for Schedule 2 auctions. Schedule 1 auctions offered $25 billion on each auction, while
____________________________________________________________________
13

For TSLF data and statistics, see Federal Reserve 2018 and FRBNY 2018b.
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Schedule 2 auctions alternated offering amounts between $50 billion and $75 billion. See
figure 3 below.
Figure 3: Utilization of TSLF Schedule 2
Billions
75

Offered
Given
50

25

0
Mar 08

Jun 08

Sep 08

Dec 08

Mar 09

Jun 09

Sep 09

Dec 09

Note: Each bar represents a Schedule 2 auction. In total, there were 58 between March 27, 2008,
and January 7, 2010.
Source: Author’s analysis of FRBNY data.
The initial TSLF auction on March 27, 2008, was Schedule 2. It offered $75 billion in US
Treasury securities and was oversubscribed. The FRBNY awarded loans to 15 dealers at a
stop-out rate of 33 bps. Schedule 2 auctions offered a significantly larger amount of US
Treasury securities compared to Schedule 1, which offered $25 billion in all its TSLF
auctions. With the exception of the first Schedule 2 auction of March 27, 2008, all Schedule 2
auctions until September 11, 2008, were undersubscribed. Following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers on September 15, 2008, Schedule 2 auctions ran weekly, instead of biweekly, and
the Fed increased its offerings from $125 billion to $150 billion per month. From September
17, 2008, until April 15, 2009, all Schedule 2 weekly auctions offered $37.5 billion (only three
$35 billion).
On September 17, 2008, $70 billion in US Treasury securities were split into two auctions of
$35 billion each. The first auction introduced a relatively shorter term of 14 days (term
offered only once), while the one later the same day offered the regular 28-day term. Both of
the September 17, 2008, auctions were fully subscribed at stop-out rates of 250 bps and 300
bps, respectively. All Schedule 2 auctions from September 17, 2008, until November 5, 2008,
were oversubscribed.
Starting on April 22, 2009, Schedule 2 auctions returned to a biweekly basis and offered
$75 billion each. From December 10, 2008, until July 16, 2009, auctions were
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undersubscribed. Thereafter, participation stopped completely and Schedule 2 auctions
started to phase out, eventually ending on January 7, 2010.
Figure 4: Stop-Out Rates for TSLF Schedule 2
Basis points
Stop-out rate
300

No bids

200

100

End

Lehman Bros.

25
0
Mar 08

Jun 08

Sep 08

Dec 08

Mar 09

Jun 09

Sep 09

Dec 09

Note: The minimum bid rate was 25 bps. No bids after July 16, 2009. The last auction was held on January
7, 2010.
Source: Author’s analysis of FRBNY data.

There were 33 biweekly Schedule 1 auctions between April 3, 2008, and June 25, 2009. Each
offered $25 billion. After March 19, 2009, there was no participation. From the 26 auctions
with participation, 14 were undersubscribed. Only three consecutive Schedule 1 auctions in
the fall of 2008—following Lehman’s bankruptcy—saw a considerable hike in the stop-out
rate. These were on September 18, October 2, and October 16, with stop-out rates of 151 bps,
42 bps, and 46 bps, respectively. Overall, 15 auctions awarded loans at a stop-out rate of 10
bps (the minimum bid) and eight awarded loans within 6 bps of the minimum bid.
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Figure 5: Utilization of TSLF Schedule 1
Billions

Offered
Given
25

0
Apr 08

Aug 08

Dec 08

Apr 09

Note: Each bar represents a Schedule 1 auction. In total, there were 33 between April 3, 2008,
and June 25, 2009.
Source: Author’s analysis of FRBNY data.
Figure 6: Stop-Out Rates for TSLF Schedule 1
Basis points
150

Stop-out rate
Lehman Bros.

100

No bids

End

50

10
0
Apr 08

Jun 08

Aug 08

Oct 08

Dec 08

Feb 09

Apr 09

Jun 09

Note: The minimum bid rate was 10 bps. No bids after March 19, 2009. The last auction was
held on June 25, 2009.
Source: Author’s analysis of FRBNY data.
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The FRBNY held six TOP auctions between August 27, 2008, and June 3, 2009. The initial two
auctions of August 27 and September 10 offered $25 billion of US Treasury securities with a
fixed rate of 25 bps. Both of these auctions were fully subscribed, and dealers were awarded
the options to borrow US Treasury securities on September 24, at stop-out rates of 2 bps and
3 bps, respectively. The remaining four TOP auctions offered $50 billion in options. These
were held in the end of 2008, on November 10, and December 2, and in 2009, on March 3,
and June 3. The two auctions in 2009 were undersubscribed, and the options awarded were
not exercised. The TOP ended in July 2009, in view of low demand and improved market
conditions.
Figure 7: Utilization of TOP
Billions

Offered

50

Options Given
Excercised

25

0
Aug 08

Oct 08

Dec 08

Feb 09

Apr 09

Jun 09

Note: Each bar represents a TOP auction. In total, there were six between August 27, 2008, and June
3, 2009. Of notice was that Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. did not exercise a $2 billion option received in
the first auction.
Source: Author’s analysis of FRBNY data.
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Figure 8: Stop-Out Rates for TOP Options
Date

Aug 27,
2008

Sep 10,
2008

Nov 10,
2008

Dec 2,
2008

Mar 3,
2009

Jun 3,
2009

Basis Points

2

3

2

5

1

1

Note: The FRBNY auctioned options to loan US Treasury securities at a fixed rate, about two to
three weeks after the auction date.
Source: FRBNY data.
Figure 9: Fixed Rates of US Treasury Securities under TOP
Date

Aug 27,
2008

Sep 10,
2008

Nov 10,
2008

Dec 2,
2008

Mar 3,
2009

Jun 3,
2009

Basis Points

25

25

50

50

25

25

Source: FRBNY data.

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. The Federal Reserve invoked the emergency powers under FRA Section 13(3) to
establish the Term Securities Lending Facility.
In March 2008, the 2007–09 financial crisis reached a critical stage. Amid falling house prices
and downgrades of mortgage-related securities, financial markets became severely
disrupted. In response, the Federal Reserve Board, in order to act as lender of last resort to
primary dealers, invoked the emergency powers of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act,
last used during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Under Section 13(3), the Board could
decide to lend to nondepository institutions in “unusual and exigent circumstances.” The
approval of a majority vote of the FOMC was also required because the action would affect
open market operations. On March 10, 2008, with a unanimous vote of the five sitting Board
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and a 9–0 vote of the FOMC, the TSLF was approved
(Bernanke 2015).
2. The TSLF was administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The Fed, primarily through the FRBNY, crafted the TSLF. In the open market operations, the
FRBNY trades US government securities with designated primary dealers (securities firms)
on a regular basis. The TSLF took advantage of existing infrastructure and some similarities
in design with the OMOs (Federal Reserve 2009; Geithner 2014).
3. The FRBNY was authorized to lend up to $200 billion in US Treasury securities.
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In view of the great demand in the markets for US Treasury securities as a “safe haven,” the
FRBNY lent highly liquid US Treasury securities such as Treasury bills, notes, bonds, and
inflation-indexed securities, at a 28-day term—much longer than the overnight term—and
against a broader range of collateral. Initially, the list of eligible collateral included collateral
that was illiquid at the time, such as triple-A private-label residential mortgage-backed
securities and commercial MBS, as well as agency collateralized mortgage obligations. The
FRBNY drew the US Treasury securities from the System Open Market Account. After
financial markets improved in June 2009, the Fed reduced its size to $75 billion. The TSLF
ended in February 2010 (Federal Reserve 2009; Federal Reserve 2010).
4. The TSLF lent highly liquid US Treasury securities, not cash.
While other Fed lending facilities involved cash, the TSLF involved only securities. Through
the TSLF, primary dealers settled repurchase agreements in which they received highly
liquid US Treasury securities in exchange for less liquid securities.
Officials from the FRBNY have stated that the TSLF, as a securities-for-securities lending
program, did not affect the supply of bank reserves and that “the benefit was that the Fed
was not adding more cash to the economy and therefore did not have to take offsetting
actions to manage the fed funds rate. This was a key difference in TSLF from the SingleTranche repo program and from the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, and meant it could be
scaled up or down more quickly” (Logan, Nelson, and Parkinson 2018).
5. TSLF loans were recourse.
The loans were recourse. That is, in case of default, the Fed could go after the primary
dealer’s assets to claim for the difference between the liquidation of the pledged collateral
and the value of the loan (GAO 2011).
6. Participation was limited to the 20 primary dealers of the FRB-NY.
Only the 20 primary dealers of the FRBNY, including the five largest US investment banks
and the US securities arms of major foreign financial institutions, were eligible to participate
in the TSLF (Fed 2008).
7. The FRBNY awarded loans through weekly auctions.
With an auction mechanism, the Fed intended to encourage broad participation and avoid
any stigmatization in using this facility. The upper limits for primary dealers on the share of
the auction that they could get guaranteed that multiple of them would be awarded TSLF
loans. The TSLF consisted of weekly auctions that lasted for 30 minutes. The day before an
auction, the Fed announced the amount and securities offered. Participation was voluntary
and bids represented the fee dealers intended to pay to loan the offered US Treasury
securities. Auction results were communicated shortly thereafter (Federal Reserve 2008b).
8. The auctions were classified into two categories, including a Schedule 2 for
relatively illiquid assets.
Auctions were classified into two categories: Schedule 1 and Schedule 2. While Schedule 1
auctions accepted all collateral eligible in FRBNY open market operations, Schedule 2
auctions accepted a much broader and less liquid range of collateral and required a higher
minimum bid. The two different schedules were intended “to better calibrate the interest
rate on TSLF loans to the level of risk associated with the collateral” (GAO 2011).
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Schedule 1 eligible collateral included: Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and
agency MBS.; whereas Schedule 2 collateral included: all Schedule 1 eligible collateral, plus
triple-A private-label residential MBS and commercial MBS, and agency CMOs (FRBNY
2008a). On April 29, 2008, Schedule 2 collateral was expanded to include triple-A assetbacked securities (Federal Reserve 2008b). And on September 14, 2008, a day prior to the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Board and the FOMC broadened the list to include all
investment-grade debt securities (BBB- or higher) (Federal Reserve 2008c).
9. The TSLF weekly auctions alternated between Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 collateral
and the timing was revised shortly before Lehman Brothers failed.
TSLF auctions started on March 27, 2008, and ran weekly, alternating between Schedule 1
and Schedule 2, until September 11, 2008. In these first months of operation, the Fed offered
$175 billion of the available $200 billion: $50 billion for Schedule 1 auctions and $125 billion
for Schedule 2 auctions. Schedule 1 auctions offered $25 billion each, while Schedule 2
auctions alternated offering amounts between $50 billion and $75 billion.
On September 14, 2008, one day before Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the Fed revised the
timing of Schedule 2 auctions to run weekly, rather than biweekly. It also increased the size
from $125 billion to $150 billion per month. From September 17, 2008, until April 15, 2009,
all Schedule 2 weekly auctions offered $37.5 billion (only three $35 billion). As financial
conditions improved in 2009, the size and timing of Schedule 2 auctions was decreased, and
they eventually ended on January 7, 2010.
10. Margins (haircuts) were imposed according to the type of collateral.
The FRBNY determined margin requirements. These did not change throughout the crisis.
Haircuts aimed to reduce the Fed’s risk in case of bankruptcy of a primary dealer (Federal
Reserve 2009). Additionally, collateral on review for downgrade was not accepted. For
securities posted as collateral that were on review for downgrade, the Fed could demand
that they be replaced with other eligible securities (FRBNY 2009).
11. Two clearing banks provided the custody and valuation of collateral.
The FRBNY relied on the clearing services of the existing clearing banks in the triparty repo
market, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon. They functioned as intermediaries
and provided the services of custody and valuation of collateral. Their services came at no
charge to the Federal Reserve or borrowers.
The clearing banks conducted daily revaluations of collateral to make sure the specified
margin was applied. The US Treasury securities awarded remained in the clearing banks, but
dealers could use them to settle repo contracts. In case the value of the collateral decreased,
the FRBNY could ask for substitutions. On the other hand, primary dealers could also
substitute collateral for other eligible collateral if needed. To value the pledged collateral,
clearing banks used the lowest price available in their valuation systems (Federal Reserve
2009).
12. Minimum bids were set at levels considered low during the crisis but high during
normal times.
The minimum bid for Schedule 1 auctions was 10 bps and for Schedule 2 was higher at 25
bps. There was no cost to place a bid (FRBNY 2008). Many of the Fed’s lending programs
during the crisis were intended to be self-liquidating as markets improved. Minimum bid
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rates and collateral requirements were set to be attractive when markets were disrupted but
unattractive when markets functioned well (Kohn 2008).
13. Primary dealers had a limit on borrowing.
Primary dealers could place up to two bids, with a minimum amount of $10 million and not
higher than 20% of the total offered amount. In case of two bids, they could only be in
increments of $10 million. Primary dealers could be awarded a maximum of only 20% of the
total offering amount, regardless if the auction was undersubscribed. The Fed set limits “to
ensure that the lending [was] distributed across multiple institutions” (Logan 2009). The
FRBNY held the right to refuse any bid at its own discretion (FRBNY 2008a). Awards were
determined on a pro rata basis, and dealers were not allowed to terminate a loan early
(Federal Reserve 2008).
14. Loans were awarded at a uniform fee, based on the lowest accepted bid—the
“stop-out rate.”
At the end of the auction, the uniform fee was set based on the stop-out rate, which was the
lowest accepted bid (GAO 2011).
15. The TSLF Options Program was an extension to the TSLF.
The TOP was approved on July 24, 2008, and announced on July 30, 2008. It was an extension
to the TSLF and required administrative changes pursuant to Schedule 2 auctions and not
another FRA Section 13(3) authorization. The TOP intended to provide primary dealers
some relief during periods of “heightened collateral market pressure, such as quarter-end
dates.”
The new program authorized the FRBNY to offer “options” to loan US Treasury securities for
a seven-day term, two to three weeks after the auction date and at a fixed rate. In some way,
the TOP was a pre-auction that gave primary dealers the guarantee that they could have
access to liquid assets at a later date, without the commitment to exercise the options. The
TOP was limited to $50 billion in US Treasury securities, on top of the $200 billion of
Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 programs. The minimum bid rate was 1 bp, and all Schedule 2
collateral was eligible. The day before each TOP auction, the FRBNY announced the terms
and conditions, including the fixed rate of the loans. The TOP held its first auction on August
27, 2008 (OIG 2010.).
16. While the TSLF was operational, the identity of the borrowers was undisclosed.
While the TSLF was in operation, the Fed published information on awards, stop-out rates,
and bid-to-cover ratios, but it did not disclose the identity of the participant primary dealers
or the bid propositions.
In July 2010, the US Congress passed Dodd-Frank. The measures included to promote
transparency required the Fed to disclose certain information on their emergency lending
programs. In regard to the TSLF, on December 1, 2010, the Fed disclosed detailed
information about borrowers between December 1, 2007, and July 21, 2010. The
information included the identity of the borrowers, dates, type and amounts of financial
assistance provided, the interest charged, and pledged collateral.
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III. Evaluation
The nature of the TSLF as one of many temporary emergency lending facilities makes it hard
to evaluate. However, it would be useful to consider at least three components: 1) the effects
the announcement had on financial markets, 2) the effectiveness of the TSLF in providing
relief to primary dealers or the repo market, and 3) the auction design and legislative tools.
The effect of the TSLF announcement is unclear. While Fed Chairman Bernanke (2015) was
of the opinion that “market participants applauded,” US Treasury Secretary Paulson (2010)
thought that “… the opposite happened. It was an indication of the markets’ jitters that some
took the move as a confirmation of their worst fears: things must be very serious indeed for
the Fed to take such unprecedented action.”
Fleming, Hrung, and Keane (2010) and Hrung and Seligman (2011) have argued that the
TSLF contributed in the reduction of stress on repo markets. Acharya et al. (2017), using
proprietary data, concluded that primary dealers that possessed less liquid collateral, lower
equity returns, and greater leverage prior to the crisis were more inclined to borrow and at
higher bidding rates.
The Fed’s emergency lending facilities under Section 13(3), such as the TSLF, raised concerns
among the public for the lack of transparency on the valuation of pledged collateral and the
undisclosed identity of the borrowers. In May 2008, a Bloomberg News reporter requested
that the Fed Board, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and via email, provide
detailed information with respect to securities posted as collateral for multiple emergency
lending facilities, such as the TSLF. In the court case Bloomberg L.P. v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Fed officials cited adverse effects to the disclosure of the
detailed information such as stigma and the potential reluctance of borrowers to use the
facilities in the future. In addition, they added that the disclosure of “highly sensitive”
information could cause “substantial competitive harm.” Furthermore, the “public disclosure
of information regarding specific securities pledges as collateral for individual TSLF loans
would significantly harm the Government’s monetary functions or commercial interests”
(Logan 2009; Madigan 2009). Ultimately, in 2011, the court ruled that the Fed was required
to release some of the information solicited.
In July 2010, the Congress passed Dodd-Frank. Measures to promote transparency required
the Fed to disclose information on their emergency lending programs between 2007 and
2010. In regard to the TSLF, on December 1, 2010, the Fed disclosed detailed information
about borrowers between December 1, 2007, and July 21, 2010. The information included
the identity of the borrowers, dates, type and amounts of financial assistance provided, the
interest charged, and pledged collateral.14 It appears that the TSLF as a temporary
emergency lending facility had an implicit agreement that specific information on
participants was going to remain undisclosed. However, the outcome of the Bloomberg FOIA
case and the Dodd-Frank act required the Fed to be more transparent. These outcomes have
set a precedent that could change the perceptions of the Fed and primary dealers in
designing a similar facility in the future.
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V.

Key Program Documents

Summary of Program
Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Term
Securities Lending Facility (Federal Reserve 2009) – The US Federal Reserve filed the TSLF
report to the US Congress pursuant to section 129 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008. The report provided updates concerning the TSLF which was established by the Board
under
section
13(3)
of
the
Federal
Reserve
Act .
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/129tslf.pdf.
The Federal Reserve’s Section 13(3) Lending Facilities to Support Overall Market Liquidity:
Function, Status, and Risk Management, November 16, 2010 (Federal Reserve 2010) – The
Office of Inspector General presented a report on the Federal Reserve’s Section 13(3) Lending
Facilities implemented during the 2007-09 financial crisis. This report provided an independent
review
of
the
six
lending
facilities’
functions,
status,
and
risks.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRS_Lending_Facilities_Rep
ort_final-11-23-10_web.pdf.
Term Securities Lending Facility: Frequently Asked Questions (Federal Reserve Bank of New
York 2008) – The TSLF: Frequently Asked Questions addresses operational questions about the
Term
Securities
Lending
Facility
(TSLF).
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/TSLF_FAQ_09-03-24.pdf.
Term Securities Lending Facility: Program Terms and Conditions (Federal Reserve Bank of
New York 2008) – The TSLF: Program Terms and Conditions provides guidance on the TSLF’s
terms and conditions such as auctions dates, eligibility securities, fees, and minimum bids.
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https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/TSLF_Terms_Conds_09-0324.pdf.
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
Federal Reserve Act Section 13. Powers of Federal Reserve Banks (Federal Reserve 2018) –
The Federal Reserve Act, Section 13 stipulates the powers of Federal Reserve Banks. In
particular, the Federal Reserve may invoke Section 13(3) in “unusual and exigent
circumstances” for discounts for individuals, partnerships, and corporations.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRA_Section_13_Sept_19_20
08_0.pdf.
Implementing The Dodd-Frank Act: The Federal Reserve Board’s Role (Federal Reserve
2018) –The US Federal Reserve Board, responsible for issuing rules under the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, provided a list of initiatives completed, along with
proposals
the
Board
planned
through
2013.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/The%20Fed%20%20Dodd-Frank%20Act_%20Statutory%20Dates%20For%20Actions.pdf.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (US Congress (2010) – Public
Law 111–203—July 21, 2010. The Act enacted in the U.S. Congress stated “to promote the
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end ‘‘too big to fail’’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts,
to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/PUBLIC%20LAW%20111%
20203%2007-21-2010.pdf.
Press Releases/Announcements
FOMC Statement: Federal Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Specific Measures
Designed to Address Liquidity Pressures in Funding Markets (March 11, 2008) – The Federal
Reserve, in conjunction with the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central
Bank, and the Swiss National Bank announced measures to address liquidity, which included
the
establishment
of
the
TSLF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FOMC_Fed_central_banks_a
nnounce_measures_to_address_liquidity_pressures.pdf.
Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, and Swiss National Bank Announce an Expansion
of Liquidity Measures (May 2, 2008) – The Federal Reserve expanded the collateral that
primary dealers could be pledged for the TSLF Schedule 2 auctions to include AAA/Aaa-rated
asset-backed
securities.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fed_ECB_SNB_announce_ex
pansion_liquidity_measures.pdf.
Federal Reserve Announces Steps to Enhance the Effectiveness of Its Existing Liquidity
Facilities (July 30, 2008) – The Federal Reserve expanded the TSLF to include a TSLF Options
Program for $50 billion. It offered primary dealers through auctions the option to borrow U.S.
Treasury securities for a 7-day term, two to three weeks after the auction date and at a fixed
rate. The Federal Reserve intended to “offer such options for exercise in advance of periods that
are typically characterized by elevated stress in financial markets, such as quarter ends.”
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Fed_announces_steps_enha
nce_effectiveness_existing_liquidity_facilities.pdf.
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Federal Reserve Board Announces Several Initiatives to Provide Additional Support to
Financial Markets, Including Enhancements to Its Existing Liquidity Facilities (September
14, 2008). – The Federal Reserve Board announced multiple initiatives to support financial
markets, including enhancements to existing liquidity facilities. The collateral for the TSLF was
expanded for Schedule 2 auctions to include all investment-grade debt securities.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/FRB_PR_09-14-2008.pdf.
Federal Reserve Announces the Extension of Three Liquidity Facilities through April 30,
2009 (December 2, 2008) – Due to continuing strains in financial markets, the Federal Reserve
extended through April 30, 2009, three liquidity facilities: the PDCF, the AMLF, and the TSLF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Federal%20Reserve%20Bo
ard%20%20Federal%20Reserve%20announces%20the%20extension%20of%20three%20liquidit
y%20facilities%20through%20April%2030,%202009.pdf.
Federal Reserve Announces Extension through October 30, 2009, of Its Existing Liquidity
Programs That Were Scheduled to Expire on April 30, 2009 (February 3, 2009) – The Federal
Reserve extended through October 30, 2009 liquidity programs scheduled to expire on April 30,
2009 that include the AMLF, the CPFF, the MMIFF, the PDCF, and the TSLF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Federal%20Reserve%20Bo
ard%20%20Federal%20Reserve%20announces%20extension%20through%20October%2030,%
202009,%20of%20its%20existing%20liquidity%20programs%20that%20were%20sched
uled%20to%20expire%20on%20April%2030,%202009.pdf.
Federal Reserve Announces Extensions of and Modifications to a Number of Its Liquidity
Programs (June 25, 2009) – The Federal Reserve, in view of very weak demand for TSLF
auctions in previous months, suspended TSLF Schedule 1 and TSLF Options Program auctions.
It
reduced
the
frequency
and
size
of
TSLF
Schedule
2
auctions.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Federal%20Reserve%20Bo
ard%20%20Federal%20Reserve%20announces%20extensions%20of%20and%20modifications
%20to%20a%20number%20of%20its%20liquidity%20programs.pdf.
Federal Reserve Announces Term Auction Facility (TAF) and Term Securities Lending
Facility (TSLF) Schedules through January 2010 (September 24, 2009) – The Federal Reserve
extended TAF and TSLF operations through January 2010. In light of continuing improvements
in financing markets, the amounts offered in TSLF auctions were reduced.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Federal%20Reserve%20Bo
ard%20%20Federal%20Reserve%20announces%20Term%20Auction%20Facility%20(TAF)%20
and%20Term%20Securities%20Lending%20Facility%20(TSLF)%20schedules%20throug
h%20January%202010.pdf.
Federal Reserve Releases Detailed Information about Transactions Conducted to Stabilize
Markets during the Recent Financial Crisis (December 1, 2010) – As required by the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the Federal Reserve posted
transaction-level details from December 1, 2007, to July 21, 2010, on multiple lending facilities
employed
during
the
2007-09
financial
crisis,
including
the
TSLF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Federal%20Reserve%20Bo
ard%20%20Federal%20Reserve%20releases%20detailed%20information%20about%20transacti
ons%20conducted%20to%20stabilize%20markets%20during%20the%20recent%20fina
ncial%20crisis.pdf.
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Term Securities Lending Facility: Announcements (Accessed December 12, 2018) – The
Federal Reserve Bank of New York provided a timeline of important announcements regarding
the
TSLF.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Term%20Securities%20Le
nding%20Facility_%20Announcements%20%20FEDERAL%20RESERVE%20BANK%20of%20NEW%20YORK.pdf.
Reports/Assessments
Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Policies and Processes for Managing Emergency
Assistance, July 2011 (US Government Accountability Office 2011) – As directed by the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the US Government Accountability
Office conducted an audit of theemergency loan programs and other assistance authorized by
the
Federal
Reserve
Board
during
the
2007-09
financial
crisis.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/GAO_Report_07-2011.pdf.
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Appendix A: TSLF Timeline

Date

Event

Mar/11/2008

TSLF announced. Auctions of highly liquid US Treasury securities to primary dealers of up to
$200 billion per month.

Mar/20/2008

TSLF details and eligible collateral for each type of auction announced:
Schedule 1: $50 billion per month.
Auctions of $25 billion each.
Treasury securities, agency debt securities, and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
Schedule 2: $125 billion per month.
Alternating auctions of $50 billion and $75 billion.
All Schedule 1 eligible collateral, triple-A private-label residential MBS and commercial MBS,
and agency collateralized mortgage obligations.

Mar/27/2008

First TSLF auction: Schedule 2 for $75 billion.

Apr/29/2008

Schedule 2: eligible collateral expanded to include triple-A asset-backed securities (ABS).

Jul/24/2008

TSLF Options Program (TOP) of $50 billion approved.
TSLF extended until January 30, 2009.

Aug/27/2008

First TOP auction.

Sep/14/2008

Schedule 2: size increased from $125 billion to $150 billion per month.
Auctions to run weekly for $37.5 billion (most cases).
Eligible collateral expanded to include all investment-grade securities (BBB- or higher).

Sep/15/2008

Lehman Brothers collapsed. The largest bankruptcy in US history.

Oct/01/2008

TSLF reaches its peak usage of $236 billion.

Dec/02/2008

TSLF extended until April 30, 2009.

Jan/27/2009

TSLF extended through October 30, 2009.

Jun/03/2009

Last TOP auction.

Jun/23/2009

TSLF extended until February 1, 2010, but only for Schedule 2 auctions.
Schedule 2: size decreased to $75 billion per month.
Auctions to run once a month.

Jun/25/2009

Last Schedule 1 auction.

Jul/16/2009

Last Schedule 2 loans given.

Sep/22/2009

Schedule 2: size decreased to $50 billion for October and $25 billion thereafter.

Jan/07/2010

Last Schedule 2 auction.

Feb/01/2010

TSLF ended.
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